ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW [Vol. 34:21 most, although not all, issues" (340). However, "thermometer ratings," a direct measure of social distance developed by Schuman et al. (1997) , contradicts claims that whites' social distance to blacks has gradually decreased. In Schuman et al.'s study, whites were asked to place African Americans on a scale from 0 to 100, indicating how "warm" or "cool" they feel toward them. Interestingly, scores about blacks have hardly va ried over the past forty years. "The rating in 1964, when whites were first asked to rate blacks, was sixty, and in 1994 it was sixty-one" (Schuman et al. 1997: 187) .
Despite the substantial increase in Hispanic and Asian populations in the United States, there is little research on social distances of whites to Hispanics or Asians. Consequently, there exists basically no direct evi dence of social distances between whites and these two groups. A lack of knowledge about the social positions of non-black minorities prevents a fuller understanding of the social positions of not only non-blacks but also blacks (Yancey 2003) .
Furthermore, there is a paucity of comparative analysis on the rela tive order of whites' social distances to racial or ethnic minorities using direct measures of social distance. Existing studies seem to poiht to the greatest social distance between whites and blacks. For instance, Yancey (2003) argued that "the possibility of assimilation, or a thinning of their racial identity, is stronger for Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans than for African Americans" (83). Blacks experience less assimilation "much more likely due to external rejection than to any internal prefer ence for segregation" (Yancey 2003: 80) . Studies of residential segrega tion (e.g., Denton 1987, 1993) have consistently found that black-white residential segregation is the highest, followed by Hispanic white, and Asian-white segregation. Additionally, the composition of Asians and Hispanics in neighborhoods does not matter much to whites, but African American composition matters (Emerson, Chai and Yancey 2001) . Statistics on interracial marriage suggest that whites tend to op pose marrying blacks, but are less concerned about marrying Asians or Hispanics (Yancey 2003) . However, these existing studies do not employ a direct measure of social distance.
Additionally, there is inadequate research on what types of whites tend to keep a greater or smaller social distance to minority.-groups. Whites "differ significantly in the ways that they think about and act toward these racial others" (Feagin and O'Brien 2004: 96) . Socioeco nomic status, region of residence, age, gender, and personal experience with a particular minority group are often identified or hypothesized as markers of whites associated with their social distances to minorities. Some studies maintain that white Southerners, older whites, and whites who have less contact with minority groups tend to be more prejudiced and maintain a greater social distance to minorities (Brink and Harris 1966; Campbell 1971; Feagin and O'Brien 2004; Jaynes and Williams 2000; Schuman et al. 1997; Tuch and Martin 1997) . But the effects of some other factors, such as gender and income, are less clear. There are other predictors of social distance that have not been explored.
In an effort to expand the existing literature, this study examines the relative order in social distances of whites to African Americans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans by investigating how white Ameri cans feel toward these three minority groups. The study attempts to an swer two research questions: First, what are the differences between whites and major racial or ethnic minorities including African Ameri cans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans in social distance? Sec ond, what kinds of whites are more likely to maintain a greater or smaller social distance to the three minority groups?
The next section reviews theoretical perspectives on group differ ences in social distance and proposes hypotheses to be tested. The description of the data and methods follows. Finally, results will be presented and discussed.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Several theoretical perspectives are relevant to our understanding of social distances between whites and racial or ethnic minority groups. The assimilation theory proposed by Robert E. Park (1937) , as well as its variant by Milton Gordon (1964) , suggests that racial/ethnic relations go through progressive and irreversible cycles, eventually leading to the as similation of minority groups into the mainstream culture and the disap pearance of cultural and ethnic differences. As a result of diminished ethnic cultures, social distances of whites to racial and ethnic minorities should also decrease and eventually disappear.
The cultural pluralism perspective suggests relative equality be tween groups. Two distinct cultures are not expected to merge as assimi lation theories predict, but rather remain distinct and coexistent (Yancey 2003 ; Yang 2000) . This theory assumes that minority groups will pre serve their own traditions, languages, customs, and lifestyles, while also sharing a number of traits with the dominant group (Herring and Amis sah 1997; Patchen 1999; Yang 2000) . According to this perspective, there should be no clear preferences by whites. Social distances between whites and all racial minority groups should be similar, and members of the dominant group supposedly feel favorably toward all minorities. Both the assimilation and cultural pluralism perspectives suggest that social distances of whites to minority groups either do not exist or are insignificant.
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On the contrary, some theories argue for the inevitable existence of social distances of whites to racial or ethnic minority groups. The theory of caste system is one example. This theory analogizes race relations in the United States -especially relations between whites and blacks -to relations between different castes in India (Beteille 1990) . Merton (1941) asserted that African Americans occupy the lowest social position and represent the lowest racial caste. European Americans, on the other hand, occupy the highest social position and constitute the highest racial caste. Along the line of the caste system perspective, Healey (2004) pointed to a great stability in rankings of different groups by whites. For decades, rankings remain as follows: groups from Northern and Western Europe tend to be ranked by whites as the highest, followed by groups from Southern and Eastern Europe, with other racial or ethnic minorities situated close to the bottom of the hierarchy. Similarly, James Geschwender (1978) introduced the "color-gradient" system. He stated that lighter-skinned groups are ranked higher and experience far less dis crimination than members of darker-skinned groups. The color-gradient theory acknowledges the existence of social distances. In this study, Asian Americans are perceived as having lighter skin than Hispanics. Therefore, according to the system of color-gradient, whites should maintain the least social distance to Asians, followed by Hispanics and blacks.
Conflict theories are also pertinent to the analysis of social distance. These theories are based on the premise that "economic forces are at the root of ethnic antagonisms" (Herring and Amissah 1997: 125) , sug gesting that relations between different racial and ethnic groups are de termined by subordination, exploitation, and resource inequalities (Herring and Amissah 1997) . Conflict theories imply that social dis tances between whites and minority groups are greater than those be tween minority groups themselves. Furthermore, whites supposedly reject all minority groups and vice versa. Another perspective to consider is the alienation thesis. Glazer (1993) argued that assimilation does not happen equally for all groups, especially not for African Americans. Sta tistics of intermarriage and residential or school segregation support Glazer' s claim that compared to Hispanics and Asians, blacks remain the least assimilated minority group. As a result, African Americans might be more alienated by the dominant group than other racial and ethnic groups. Similarly, according to Yancey (2003) , the alienation suffered by African Americans is of a different level than alienation suffered by His panics and Asians. As a result, African Americans are destined to remain an "outcast race" (Yancey 2003 : 13) . The alienation thesis recognizes the existence of social distances and would predict smaller social dis-tances between whites and non-black racial minorities and a greater so cial distance between whites and blacks.
Rejecting the order-oriented theories and following the line of the conflict-oriented theories, we argue that social distances exist between whites and racial or ethnic minorities. Specifically, we hypothesize that whites feel "coolest" toward African Americans, "warmest" toward Asian Americans, and somewhat "warm" toward Hispanics. This hypoth esis is based on several considerations. One consideration is the prevail ing group image. Whites often refer to Asian Americans as "a model minority" (Takaki 1989) , which despite all prejudices and discrimination succeeds economically, socially, and educationally (Schaeffer 20 10). This attitude supposedly contributes to a smaller social distance of whites to Asians. Feagin and O'Brien (2004) asserted that whites often associate Asian Americans with intelligence and education and deem both Asian and Hispanic Americans as hard workers. This also indirectly implies smaller social distances between these two groups and whites, compared to blacks. In contrast, whites' negative perceptions of African Americans tend to prevail, especially when it comes to socioeconomic success (Bobo, Kluegel and Smith 1997) . Whites tend to think of blacks as "less intelligent, more violence prone, lazier, less patriotic, and more likely to prefer living off welfare than whites" (Bobo and Kluegel 1997 : 118) . Some researchers have concluded that while blacks are likely to be open to interaction with other groups, "the desire for social distance from Afri can Americans is generally greater than the desire for social distance from virtually all other groups on virtually all fronts" (Herring and Amis sah 1997: 142) .
Group conflict is another consideration. Historically, group conflict between whites and blacks has been the most severe. Blacks were the only minority group enslaved, and extensive discrimination against them continued even after slavery was abolished. Frequently, white-black con flict is elevated to violent confrontation. Examples from the past are lynching of blacks by whites after the Civil War and Reconstruction, riots of white workers against blacks, or hostile sentiments through hate speeches by Ku Klux Klan (Yang 2000) . As a consequence of historical events, there might be greater tension in the present relationship between whites and blacks than between whites and Asians or Hispanics. Ethnic conflict between whites and these latter two groups has been somehow less severe. The initial contact situation between different racial groups might have an influence on present social distances. Blauner (1972) distin guished between "most colonized" and "most immigrant" minorities. This perspective proposes that initial contact can have an impact on the contemporary situation of a particular group, with most colonized minor ities currently having a more disadvantageous situation. According to Blauner's theory, Asians and Hispanics among the most immigrant mi norities, and blacks are among the most colonized minorities, which could also account for the greater social distance between whites and blacks.
What kinds of whites are more likely to have a greater or smaller social distance to minority groups? We expect that whites with a higher socioeconomic status, such as a higher education, a higher occupational prestige score, and a higher family income, tend to maintain a smaller social distance with the minorities than whites with a lower socioeco nomic status. According to Campbell (1971) , intellectual growth contrib utes to more positive racial attitudes. Similarly, Noel (1971) argued that a higher education level is associated with a more liberal way of think ing. Weil (1985) pointed to the consistency of research in reporting the positive relationship between higher educational attainment and social or political tolerance. Schuman et al. (1997) found that education of whites has a significant effect on promoting liberal racial attitudes. If more edu cated whites are on average more liberal, they also might be less prejudiced and more likely to accept people of different races or ethnici ties. Therefore, we hypothesize that more educated whites tend to main tain a smaller social distance with minorities than less educated whites. The higher level of education results in a better job and a higher occupa tional prestige. Therefore, the effect of occupational prestige on whites' social distances to minorities is anticipated to be the same as that of education.
Existing research presents inconclusive results regarding the effect of income on social distance. Campbell (1971) found very little variation in racial attitudes of whites with different income levels. According to Schuman et al. (1997) , the impact of income level on racial attitudes toward blacks might vary with the kind of questions asked. For example, "higher income is positively related to willingness to vote for a black candidate, but it is negatively related to support for special programs to advance the economic position of blacks " (1997: 230) . Assuming that higher income is associated with higher education, and higher education with more liberal attitudes, it is anticipated that income is inversely re lated to the social distance of whites to minorities.
Some demographic characteristics of whites are expected to have an influence on social distances. One of these characteristics is gender. Few studies examined the effect of gender on racial attitudes. For example, Schuman et al. (1997) found that white women tend to be less conserva tive on most racial policy issues than white men, with the exception of more intimate racial contact, such as intermarriage or support for schools where the majority of students are black. Johnson and Marini (1998) con cluded that white women are more likely to approve of interracial contact and consider it more desirable than white men. Therefore, it is antici pated that white men maintain a greater social distance from minorities than their female counterparts.
Self-employed whites are more likely to face competition from mi nority business owners than white employees. Asian Americans tend to be successful small-business owners (Schaefer 2010) . The success of self-employed Asians presents potential economic competition with self employed whites. According to Bobo and Hutchings (1996) , in terms of economic and job competition, whites feel the most threatened by Asians, and the least by blacks. This leads to the expectation of a greater social distance between self-employed whites and minorities than that between white employees and minorities. Noel (1971) argued that white Southerners are less liberal in their racial attitudes because their racial socialization is different from sociali zation of white non-Southerners. Middleton (1976) stated that in the 1960s, residents of the South were more prejudiced against blacks than those living in other regions, regardless of their psychological character istics, socioeconomic status, and the degree of urbanization or ethnic composition of the region. According to Wilson (1996) , the gap in racial and ethnic prejudice between Southern whites and whites in other re gions has narrowed over time, but regional differences in white attitudes remain. The West, the Northeast, and to a lesser extent the Midwest, are more liberal than the South. Tuch and Martin (1997) found that Southern whites "are the least likely to endorse policies intended to ameliorate racial inequality " (1997: 173) . This leads to our expectation that South ern whites tend to maintain greater social distances from minorities than whites living in other regions.
Protestantism, the most prevalent religion in the United States, re flects beliefs of the dominant group, which normally do not favor racial and ethnic differences. This is reflected by the religious affiliation of maj or racial and ethnic groups. With the exception of blacks, minorities tend to prefer religions other than dominant Protestantism. Hispanics are largely Catholics and Asians tend to be associated with Eastern religions.
Hence, we expect that white Protestants are more likely to have a greater social distance from minorities than white non-Protestants.
Whites born in the United States do not share immigration and natu ralization experience with many Asians, Hispanics, and blacks who were born abroad. In addition, native-born whites tend to claim as just Ameri can, and they either lack an ethnic identity or practice symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979; Waters 1990) . As a result, they may be less sensitive to the diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds of minorities. In contrast, foreign born whites are more likely to retain their ethnicity and practice their ethnic cultures. Thus, we hypothesize that U.S.-born whites maintain a greater social distance to minorities than foreign-born whites.
The Republican Party is often perceived as less favorable toward minorities on several social issues. Blacks largely identify with the Dem ocratic Party, as do Hispanics, with the exception of Cubans. In the 1990s, Asians were more or less evenly divided between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party (Nakanishi 1991) , but their political affil iation is currently shifting more toward the Democratic Party. Based on these political orientations, it is expected that white Republicans tend to maintain a greater social distance to minorities than white non Republicans.
We hypothesize that younger generations of whites are more likely to maintain a smaller social distance to African Americans, Asian Ameri cans, and Hispanic Americans than earlier generations of whites. This pattern assumes progressive trends and a gradual decline in social dis tances of whites to all minorities over time (Schuman et al. 1997) . Re searchers often point to progress in racial attitudes of whites toward blacks (Campbell 1971; Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Schuman et al. 1997) . Limited evidence exists in support of liberalization of whites' ra cial attitudes toward Asians and Hispanics. However, according to Wil son (1996) , social distances of whites to these two minorities are also declining. While it is expected that whites' social distances to all minori ties have decreased, the rates might vary across different groups. The decline in whites' social distance to blacks may be smaller than that to Asians or Hispanics.
DATA AND METHODS

Samp le
Data from the 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) are used to test the proposed hypotheses, because the 2002 GSS is the only sample that contains information on social distances of whites to minorities. The analysis is restricted to white respondents only because the study focuses on social distances of white Americans to racial or ethnic minorities. In addition, only the respondents who provided valid responses to the de-pendent variables on feelings toward racial/ethnic minorities (discussed below) are selected for analysis. The data were weighted so that only one adult per household was included in the sample. After the restrictions, the sample size is 1,85 1 for all three dependent variables.
The data set used in this analysis has several advantages. The 2002 GSS is a nationally representative sample of U.S. non-institutionalized, adult population aged 18 or over, and it allows for the generalization of findings to the U.S. population. To our knowledge, no other recent na tionally representative sample provides information on social distances of whites to minorities, which makes this sample unique. In addition, it includes many demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal variables. The large sample size permits the use of many explanatory variables and insures the reliability of statistical estimates.
Despite these merits of our sample, some limitations should be ac knowledged. Social distance can be measured by different indicators, but our sample only contains measures related to feelings toward racial or ethnic groups. Another limitation is the unavailability of some variables in this particular year, such as variables measuring direct contact be tween white Americans and minorities. These limitations notwithstand ing, this large representative sample remains the best data set available to study social distances between white Americans and racial or ethnic minorities.
Va riables and Measurements
Variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 1 . Means and standard deviations of the variables are included. Medians are in cluded for ordinal variables. The three dependent variables used in this study are 9-point scale measures, indicating the differences in feelings of white Americans toward racial and ethnic minority groups (1 indicates fe eling "warmest", and 9 feeling "coolest"). The dependent variables are based on the following three questions: "In general, how warm or cool do you feel toward African Americans?", "In general, how warm or cool do you feel toward Asian Americans?", and "In general, how warm or cool do you feel toward Hispanics?" No question about feelings toward Native Americans or Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islanders was asked in the GSS data; hence, we cannot examine feelings of whites toward these minority groups in this study.
Previous research indicates that most independent variables used in this study directly influence social distance. Several demographic vari ables are included in the analysis. Sex is a dummy variable with 1 indi cating male and 0 female. Similarly, religion is a dummy variable with 1 for the designated category Protestant and 0 for the reference category non-Protestant. We used a set of dummy variables for region of respon- Family income is measured by a 23-point scale, with income under $1,000 as the lowest category and income of $110,000 or over as the highest. Occupational prestige score is a 100-point scale with a higher score indicating a higher prestige of respondents' occupation. We used self-employment status as a measure of entrepreneurship and potential economic competition, and this variable is dummy coded 1 for the self employed and 0 for employees. Political party affiliation is also a dummy variable with 1 indicating Republican and 0 non-Republican. Finally, to measure generational differences in social distance, we created a set of dummy variables for generations using the cohort variable. The G.!. 
Methods and analytical strategies
We first compared the means of the three dependent variables to see how whites felt differently toward the three minority groups. We then did a correlational analysis to examine the initial relationships between the predictor variables and the dependent variables. Finally, we conducted an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analysis. The emphasis of this analysis is to compare the constants of the regression models in order to ascertain the differences in whites' feeling toward the three minority groups controlling for all predictors and to test what types of whites are more or less likely to have cooler feelings toward Asians, Hispanics and blacks. The OLS regression model is appropriate since the dependent variables, albeit ordinal, have a large number of categories (9).
RESULTS
Descriptive and Bivariate Analysis
As shown in Table 1 , the means of the dependent variables indicate that on the 9-point scale, white respondents felt coolest toward Asians (3.67), followed by blacks (3.62) and Hispanics (3.59). These results contradict what was expected, but the differences are small. Standard deviations for the dependent variables vary between 1.96 and 2.01, indi cating lower variation of scores in feelings of whites toward Asians and blacks and greater variation in whites' feelings toward Hispanics. Since the median scores are higher than the means in all three measures, the distribution of all dependent variables is somewhat negatively skewed, with few extremely low scores indicating very warm feelings of white�. Possible effects of skewness were tested by creating a scatterplot and by log-transforming the dependent variables, but no significant impact on regression results \v as detected.
The mean of a dummy variable can be interpreted as a percentage after multiplying it by 100. Table 1 shows that there were a lower pro portion of males (about 48 percent) than females. An overwhelming ma jority of them (93 percent) were born in the United States. Most of the respondents were employees, and about 12 percent were self-employed. The majority of the respondents (51 percent) were Protestants. About one third considered themselves to be Republican. About 31 percent of all respondents lived in the South, about 21 percent lived in the West and the Midwest respectively, and 27 percent resided in the Northeast. The respondents on average had above 14 years of schooling. The average ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW [Vol. 34:21 occupational prestige score was approximately 45 on the lOa-point scale.
The mean for family income was about 17, meaning that on average respondents' family income was between $35,000 and $39,999. Baby Boomers (39 percent) constituted the largest generation compared to other generations. Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations between all pairs of vari ables used in the analysis. The three dependent variables are correlated with one another highly, suggesting that whites had very similar feelings toward racial or ethnic minorities. The significant positive correlations between the male dummy variable and all three dependent variables indi cate that white men tended to feel cooler toward all three minority groups, especially blacks, than white women. Whites living in the West were less likely to feel cooler toward minorities than those living in other parts of the country, but there was no significant difference between whites in the Northeast and those living elsewhere. Whites in the Mid west felt cooler toward Hispanics than whites in other regions, but not toward other groups. The difference between white Republicans and white non-Republicans was not significant. As anticipated, white Protes tants tended to feel cooler toward minorities than their non-Protestant counterparts. Native-born whites felt cooler toward Hispanics than for eign-born whites, but not toward other groups. Consistent with our hy potheses, education, occupational prestige, and family income all reduced negative feelings toward all three minority groups. Self-employ ment increased negative feelings toward Asians and blacks, but not to ward Hispanics. There was no significant difference between whites of the Silent Generation or white Baby Boomers and other generations in feelings toward minorities. Whites of Generation X tended to feel signifi cantly warmer toward Asians and Hispanics, but not toward blacks. In addition, whites who belonged to Generation Y harbored less cool feel ings toward Asians and blacks than other generations. The results indi cate no multicollinearity problem.
Multivariate Analysis
For each dependent variable, we tested a number of nested regres sion models. Based on the comparison of coefficients of determination (R 2 ), the model incorporating all explanatory variables (the full model) was determined to be the best fitting model for all three groups. Because of the space constraints and for more effective presentation, only results of the best fitting model are presented (Table 3) .
To assess the overall feelings of whites toward the three minority groups, we compared constants of the full regression model for Asians, Hispanics, and blacks presented in Table 3 . The results indicate that, con trolling for all explanatory variables, whites felt warmest toward Hispan- ics (4.682), coolest toward Asians (5.418), and somewhat in-between toward blacks (4.953). These suggest that whites maintained the least social distance with Hispanics, followed by blacks and Asians. Although the differences are relatively small, these results contradict our hypothe sis about the least social distance of whites to Asians and the greatest social distance of whites to blacks. The comparison of the means in Table 1 and the constants in Table  3 for all three groups (Figure 1 ) reveals that without controlling for the predictor variables, the differences between whites and the minority groups in the feelings scales were quite small; however, controlling for the predictors, the differences increased significantly, but the order re mained the same.
FIGURE 1 COMPARISONS OF MEANS AND CONSTANTS FOR THE THREE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
To answer our second research question, we turn to the specific re gression coefficients in Table 3 . As hypothesized, controlling for other variables, a higher level of education is negatively associated with cooler feelings of whites toward all three minority groups. Also anticipated, oc cupational prestige reduces the cooler fe elings of whites toward all three minority groups, holding other variables constant. The effect of family income is in the expected direction but does not reach statistical signifi cance at the .05 level. The effect of self-employment status is expectedly positive, but significant at the .05 level only for Asians.
Among the basic demographic variables, the effect of gender on the dependent variables is highly consistent with our hypotheses. White men tend to feel significantly cooler toward all three minorities than white women. Our hypothesis about regional differences is partially supported. Whites living in the West and the Northeast feel on average significantly warmer toward all three minorities than Southern whites, but whites liv ing in the Midwest do not differ significantly from Southern whites in this regard.
We find no significant difference between white Republicans and white non-Republicans in feeling cool toward all three minority groups after holding other predictors constant. Nor do we detect a significant difference between white Protestants and white non-Protestants. Being born in the U.S. only significantly increases the cool feelings of whites toward Hispanics, but not toward blacks and Asians.
Coinciding with our hypothesis, the results indicate that the younger the generation, the warmer the fe elings of whites toward minorities, al though the differences between the Silent Generation and the G.!. Gener ation are not statistically significant at the .05 level for all three minority groups and the difference between the Baby Boomers and the G.!. Gen eration is also insignificant for Asians at the .05 level.
A comparison of standardized regression coefficients (a' s) indicates that education is the most important predictor of feelings of whites to wards all three minority groups. The effects of occupational prestige are also consistent across models.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The most important finding of this study is that in terms of whites' feeling toward minority groups, social distance is the smallest between whites and Hispanics, followed by between whites and blacks and finally by between whites and Asians. This finding contradicts our hypothesis about the least social distance of whites to Asians and the greatest social distance of whites to blacks. How do we explain this unexpected result? We offer several plausible explanations.
One possibility lies in the nativity of these particular minority groups. Because of different national cultures and social environments, the foreign-born are normally perceived as much more different from the natives, regardless of race or ethnicity, thereby leading to an increased social distance. The majority of Asians in the United States are foreign born. According to the 2000 U.S. Population Census (U.S. Census Bu reau 2003d), about 69 percent of all Asians were born outside the United States in that year. Asians are the only predominantly foreign-born group. Hence, this may largely explain the greatest social distance of whites to Asians. Nativity also explains the smaller social distance of whites to blacks, because an overwhelming majority of blacks are U.S. born and only about 6 percent of blacks were born abroad according to the 2000 U.S. Population Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2003d). However, nativity does not help in understanding why the social distance of whites to Hispanics is the smallest, since about 40 percent of Hispanic Ameri cans are also foreign-born. Hence, other factors must also be at work.
Religious similarity or dissimilarity may partly explain the un predicted fi nding. Most Hispanics, like whites, are Christians, including about 70 percent of Catholics (Schaefer 2010) . Additionally, Hispanic Americans tend to shift away from Catholicism in favor of Protestantism (Hunt 1998 ). This religious similarity may in part account for the least social distance of whites to Hispanics. In contrast, the majority of Asians are non-Christians. This religious dissimilarity, therefore, increases their social distance from whites. The fact that a large majority of African Americans are Protestants-about 82 percent according to a 1990 na tional survey (Kosmin and Lachman 1993) , largely Baptists and Method ists-partly explains the smaller social distance of whites to blacks.
Racial hierarchy and tension may partly explain why whites' social distance to blacks is in the middle. In terms of nativity and religious similarity, whites' social distance to blacks should be the smallest since the majority of blacks are native-born Protestants. Nevertheless, blacks rank low in the racial hierarchy and have greater tensions with whites. The outcome is an increased social distance between whites and blacks, although not to the extent of white-Asian social distance. This suggests that nativity and religious similarity play more important roles than racial hierarchy and tensions in social distances measured by feelings of closeness.
The geographic proximity of the country of origin might offer an other explanation. Hispanics generally originate from countries less dis tant to the United States than Asians. As a result, whites may be more familiar with Hispanic cultural backgrounds than Asians'. Hence, prox imity might help to explain why social distance between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics is smaller than that between non-Hispanic whites and Asians.
The diversity of Asians might also help to understand the greatest social distance of whites to this particular group. In spite of whites' as sumption of homogeny, Asians are very diverse (Wong et al. 1998) . Asian groups "differ from each other in language, customs and culture, physical appearance and . . . in the ways in which they have entered American society" (Healey 2004: 189) . Asians also do not share a com mon religious or political orientation. In addition, Asian groups differ greatly in their socioeconomic status. According to the 2000 Population Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2003a , 2003b , 2005 , Asian Indians fared the best in terms of major socioeconomic indicators, even better than whites, while Cambodians and Laotians fared the worst, even worse than Native Americans and Hispanics. Hispanic groups also do not think of themselves as one entity, and their diversity cannot be overlooked (Hea ley 2004). However, they still retain more common characteristics than Asians, such as religion, language, cultural traits, and with the exception of Cubans, also socioeconomic status. These common characteristics might contribute to the smaller social distance of whites to Hispanics. The devastation of African ethnic cultures by slavery and the racializa tion of Africans into a homogeneous group in the United States may also bring to light why white-black social distance is smaller than white Asian one.
The unexpected finding about the relative social distances between whites and the three major minority groups has important implications for race and ethnic relations today. The finding suggests that social dis tance in particular, and race and ethnic relations in general, are more complicated than what people normally believe. It may or may not be true to claim that white-black social distance is the greatest, depending on how social distance is measured. In terms of residential segregation and intermarriage, this claim may have merit. However, in terms of feel ings of closeness it may be invalid. In fact, Asian Americans may be the most alienated, perhaps because of their "perpetual foreigner" image. The common experiences among many Asian Americans, and especially Asian immigrants, of being sidelined, ignored, and unrecognized or under-recognized in their daily life may vindicate the finding of the greatest social distance of whites to Asians. It may also be problematic to assert that African Americans are at the bottom of the racial and ethnic hierarchy today in terms of major socioeconomic indicators and political power. In fact, Native Americans and Hispanics, on average, fare worse according to recent census data on socioeconomic indicators and political representation.
Our findings also suggest that social distance cannot be explained by any single characteristic. For example, if color alone were to deter mine social distance, the greatest social distance would exist between whites and blacks. If alienation were the only determinant, we would also find the greatest social distance between whites and blacks. If social distance were based entirely on socioeconomic status or group image, then the analysis would show the smallest social distance between whites and Asians. In fact, none of these occurs. Thus, multiple determinants must be considered to fully understand social distance.
This study also reveals that whites with a higher socioeconomic sta tus are in general more likely to maintain a smaller social distance to the three minority groups. In particular, whites with a higher level of educa tion and a higher occupational prestige score tend to maintain a smaller social distance to the minorities than whites with a lower level of educa tion and a lower prestige score. Family income works in the same direc tion, but does not attain statistical significance after controlling for other variables. These results suggest that increasing socioeconomic status is a way to reduce social distance between whites and minorities.
We also find that consistently white men tend to maintain a greater social distance to all three minority groups than white women. Whites living in the West and the Northeast tend to keep a smaller social dis tance to all three minority groups than Southern whites, but there is no significant difference in social distances to minorities between whites in the Midwest and Southern whites. On the other hand, being Republican or being Protestant does not make a significant difference in social dis tances of whites to minorities, respectively. Being native born increases whites' social distance to all three minority groups, but significantly only to Hispanics. Similarly, being self-employed significantly increases whites' social distance to Asians, but not to blacks or Hispanics. The results also reveal a general tendency that younger generations of whites are more likely to keep a smaller social distance to the minorities than older generations of whites, raising hopes of racial or ethnic integration and harmony for the fu ture.
Future research may extend the current study along several lines. Keep in mind that feeling about minority groups used in our study is only one of the measures of social distance. If other measures of social dis tance are available, they should be used to further test our hypotheses. Future research should also incorporate other possible determinants of social distance, if possible. Furthermore, it is important to study changes in social distance between whites and minorities over time when longitu dinal data become available.
